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Comments
CONTRACrS-AN ELEMENT OF NEGOTIABILITY BY CONTRACT

There is a difference of opinion -among the courts as to the effect and interpretation of a provision in a non-negotiable contract designed by the parties
to secure for the assignee of the creditor the claim free of defenses which exist
between the original parties. This type of provision has appeared in some conditional sales contracts. It allows the purchaser the benefit of financial assistance
(200)
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in the way of deferred payments, and at the same time permits the seller to assign
the purchase agreement with ease. Such a result could be obtained by the use
of a negotiable instrument if the terms of the agreement made by the parties are
consonant with such an instrument Where the terms of the contract are such
that they will not fit the required form for a negotiable instrument, the parties rely
upon this type of provision to achieve this one characteristic of negotiability. The
provision which is relied upon to cut off the obligor's defenses may be phrased in
different ways. Usually it is to the effect that the purchaser understands that the
contract is to be assigned, and agrees that the payments will be made to such
assignee without regard to any defenses, set-offs or counterclaims which the purchaser may have against the seller. It is the object of the parties to secure for
such a non-negotiable contract right one, but only one, of the advantages or attributes of negotiable paper, and not an attempt to make the agreement a negotiable instrument This is to be distinguished from an attempt to achieve full
negotiability by methods other than those prescribed by the Negotiable Instruments Law.'
The divergence of opinion amony the courts with regard to the validity and
interpretation of such provisions appears to arise primarily from differences as to
the public policy involved in such a contractual agreement. However, some courts2
appear to have been influenced by a confusion concerning questions of estoppel
3
and attempted abrogation of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
It has been said that the rule that an assignee of a non-negotiable chose in
action takes subject to any defenses, set-offs or counterclaims which exist at the
time of the assignment is so well established as a part of the common law that it
may not be changed by agreement of the parties. This view seems to be based
upon the theory that the common law rule is not merely a general statement of
relationship between the parties but is a statement of public policy. Any attempt
to change the rule by an agreement in advance to waive any defense would be
void as against public policy.
The Missouri Court of Appeals seems to take this view in Industrial Ldan
Compafty v. GrishaA4 where the court allowed the obligor to set up a defense
of breach of implied warranty of fitness and failure of consideration in spite of such
a provision. The agreement, says the court, is void as against public policy. It is

1. Beutel, Negotiability by Contract (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 205; Francis,
Do Somae of the Major Postulates of the Law of Bills and Notes Need Re-examiiktion? (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 41; Note (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 756; Comment
(1933) 8 Wis. L. REv. 272. President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan,
242 N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594 (1926); Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N. Y. 263, 164 N. E.
45 (1928).
2. Howie v. Lewis, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 239 (1900); National City Bank of
N. Y. v. Prospect Syndicate, Inc., 170 Misc. 611, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 759 (1939).
3. Industrial Loan Company v. Grisham, 115 S. W. (2d) 214 (Mo. App.
1938); American National Bank of Sari Francisco v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc., 191
Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923).
4. 115 S. W. (2d) 214 (Mo. App. 1938) supi-a note 3.
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an attempt to "settle in advance the substantive rights of the parties under the
contract and oust the courts of their jurisdiction to determine such rights." It is
evidently the opinion of the court that these defenses are so firmly established
within the substantive rights of the obligor by the common law assignment rule
,that they may not be removed by agreement. To sustain this position, San Francisco Securities Corporation v. Phoenix Motor Co.5 was cited, in which an assignment statute was relied upon. However, the Missouri Supreme Court had previously said concerning this case that a statute would seem to be unnecessary
since it merely stated a rule of common law.6 The court also said that to give
effect to such a provision would be a violation of public policy declared by the
Usury statute. Although there was no attempt to establish usury, the provision
was in terms broad enough to cut off this defense, as well as all other defenses.?
In view of this fact, the court may have considered the provision too comprehensive and all inclusive. That, however, is to overlook the possibility of interpreting
the provision as severable. If, in a particular case, the defense which the obligor
attempted to set up were one, such as usury, which is given on the basis of some
strong public policy, the provision could be held to be ineffective to waive it. If,
on the other hand, the defense were one not so strongly protected by public policy,
as warranty of fitness or failure of consideration, the provision could be given
effect."
Where there is a statute stating in substance that, "in the case of an assignment
of a thing in action, the action by the assignee shall be without prejudice to any
set-off or other defense existing at the time of, or before notice of the assignment,""
5. 25 Ariz. 531, 220 Pac. 229 (1923). See discussion in Note (1931) 19
L. REv. 544.
6. Brucker v. Georgia Casualty Co., 326 Mo. 856 32 S.W. (2d) 1088, 1092
(1938). But see WILLIsToN, CoNrRAcrs (rev. ed. 19365 § 432, in which he states
the general common law rule to be, "But the assignee of a non-negotiable chosein-action, or of a negotiable note payable to order, assigned otherwise than by
endorsement though for value, and in good faith, takes it subject to all defenses
which the obligor may have had against the assignor, unless the debtor by the
form of the instrument intrusted to the assignor or otherwise has estopped himself
to set up a defense, or has given an absolute promise to pay the assignee in substitution for the assigned obligation." (Italics mine).
7. "It is understood and agreed that this instrument and the Seller's interest
therein may be offered by the seller for discount to . ..Industrial Loan ...Co.,
and to induce said Corporation to accept such assignment, the purchaser hereby
agrees and represents to said Corporation that such assignment shall be free of any
and all defenses which the purchaser may or might have against the seller." The
court also mentioned that it would make the instrument negotiable in defiance of
the N. I. L., but it appears to be merely an attempt to secure this one characteristic of negotiability. Cf Motor Contracts Division v. Van Der Volgen, 162
Wash. 449, 298 Pac. 705 (1931).
8. United States v. Troy-Parisian, Inc., 115 F. (2d) 224 (1940); AngloCalifornia Trust Company v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 Pac. 991 (1922).
9. ARiz. REV. STAT. (1913) § 402 (ARiz. R. C. A. (1939), § 21-515). Corresponding statutes are, Calif., CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 368; Idaho, CODE
1932, § 5-302; Ind., IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1933) § 2-226; Oregon, ORE. CODE
ANN. (1930) § 1-302; Utah, REV. STAT. 1933, § 104-3-2.
CALIF.
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some courts have relied upon it as a legislative statement of public policy to hold
such a waiver provision void. In view of the statute, these courts have held the
provisions to be ineffective to waive any defense. Cases from California' 0 and
Idaho"' have so held where similar statutes were involved.12 In San Francisco
Securities Corporation v. Phoenix Motor Co.,' 3 the Arizona court followed the
California case in relying upon the statute for a statement of public policy. However, there is language to the effect that although such a statute may be needed
to protect certain defenses, it is not needed to protect others. "The aid of no
statute declaring agreements that grant immunity from the results of forcible and
fraudulent acts is necessary in order to declare such agreements against public
policy; but as to the relinquishment by contract of the right to assert the defenses
of failure of consideration, breach of warranty, and other similar pleas, the statute
itself must stand guard over the rights of the defendant, on the ground of public
policy."
On the other hand, some courts hold that although there is an assignment
statute, it is not a statement of public policy, and its benefits may be waived by the
obligor. This does not mean that the provision may be used to negate the real
defenses, or those which may be specifically provided by the legislature on the
grounds of public policy. The supreme court of Utah in Anglo-California Trust
Company v. Hall'4 clearly sets forth this position by saying, "For a purchaser to
sign a contract containing such a stipulation may not be a wise thing to do, but
courts cannot rewrite contracts into which parties have seen fit to enter, and
unless fraud or duress, or sometking against public policy, enters into the transaction, a purchaser who waives defenses, as the defendant has done, cannot obtain
relief from an improvident contract, into which he enters without care and foresight." 5 The court allowed the provision to preclude the obligor from setting up
a defense of breach of warranty of fitness. Instead of grouping all defenses to10. American National Bank of San Francisco v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc., 191
Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923), supra note 3. This court also speaks of an attempt
to attain negotiability, but the provision seeks only a waiver of defenses. It provides that in case of an assignment, "the second party shall be precluded from
in any manner attacking the validity of this contract on the ground of fraud,
duress, mistake, want of consideration,or failure of consideration, or upon any
other ground." Cf., President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242
N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594 (1926), supra note 1; Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N. Y. 263, 164
N. E. 45 (1928) supra note 1 (bond provision stating, "they are to be treated
as negotiable, and all persons are invited by the company to act accordingly.")
11. Pacific Acceptance Corporation v. Whalen, 43 Idaho 15, 248 Pac. 444
(1926).
12, Supra note 9.
13. 25 Ariz. 531, 220 Pac. 229 (1933), supra note 5.
14. 61 Utah 223, 211 Pac. 991 (1922), supra note 8.
15. (Italics mine) 211 Pac. 991, 994 (1922). Contract provision, "It is
agreed that in the event the seller shall assign and transfer this agreement and
his rights and moneys payable thereunder to a third party, then the purchaser
shall be precluded from in any manner attacking the validity of the agreement on
the ground of fraud, duress, mistake, want of consideration, or failure of considera-
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gether, this court seems to differentiate between those defenses which are provided
merely for the benefit of the individual and those which are provided for the
protection of the public welfare. This same reasoning was applied by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals sitting in Idaho in the case of United States v.
Troy-Parisian,Inc.,'8 to allow the assignee of a conditional sales contract to recover
in spite of an attempted defense of breach of warranty of fitness. The court recognizes on the basis of precedent17 that the defense of fraud or total want of consideration might not be waived, but finds no public policy which would be offended
by the waiver in favor of an assignee of warranty of fitness and failure of consideration. These defenses are provided for the benefit of the individual. If he wishes
to forego their protection, there is no public policy which would be abrogated by
his so doing. It is pointed out that the obligor still retains his right of action
for damages against the obligee for breach of contract.'
Finally, a few courts have taken an entirely different view of the public policy
involved in giving effect to such a contract provision. These opinions are based
upon the proposition that the primary public policy is the freedom of contract
with which the courts should not lightly interfere. They consider the waiver of
these defenses by the obligor against the assignee to be only the waiver of a right
of action, which, to deprive the obligor of the right to waive, would be more against
public policy than to enforce the clause.
An early case recognizing this view was Howie v. Lewis.10 A non-negotiable
note contained the provision, "this note shall be subject to the same rules governing commercial paper as to equities." The court held the provision effective to
preclude the setting up of a defense of fraud by the obligor. It was a valid contractual agreement to give the note one attribute of commercial paper, and "was
a waiver by the defendant of the right to inquire into the adequacy of the original
transaction," so far as the assignee was concerned.20 In Elzey v. Ajax Heating

tion, or upon any other ground, and the moneys payable hereunder by the purchaser shall be paid to such assignee or holder without recoupment, set-off, or
counterclaim of any sort whatsoever."
16. United States ex rel. and for Benefit of Administrator of Federal Housing
Administration v. Troy-Parisian, Inc., 115 F. (2d) 224 (1940), (certiorari denied,
312 U. S. 699), cited supra note 8.
17. Pacific Acceptance Corporation v. Whalen, 43 Idaho 15, 248 Pac. 444
(1926), supra note 11.
18. Beutel, Negotiability by Contract (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 205, supra note 1.

National City Bank v. Prospect Syndicate, Inc., 170 Misc. 611, 10 N. Y. S. (2d)
759 (1939), supra note 2, where the court gave effect to such a provision which
provided that any claims which might arise would be made by the buyer upon
the seller, and not set up as a defense to a suit by an assignee.
19. 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 232 (1900).
20. Cited in NoRToN, BILLs AND NOTES (4th ed., 1914) p. 36, n. 14, where
the author says, "a debtor in the instrument creating a non-transferable common
law obligation may effectually stipulate that the creditor's assignee may enforce
the obligation notwithstanding equities between the debtor and creditor."
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Company,2 ' the Supreme Court of New Jersey held such a provision valid and
effective in a conditional sales contract. There is language in the case strong
enough to indicate that the court would allow even real defenses to be waived by
the agreement. The court also recognizes that the waiver does not leave the obligor
without remedy, since he still has his cause of action against the vendor.
JACKSON A. WRIGHT

TORTS-DuTY TO RESCUE OR AID THIRD PERSONS PLACED IN A POSITION OF PERIL
THROUGH No FAULT OF THE DEFENDANT
The recent Indiana case of L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks" suggests the possibility
of an extension of legal duty into a field heretofore governed by moral duty only.
In that case the plaintiff, a six year old boy, accompanied his mother on a shopping
tour of the defendant's department store. The boy, while riding on the escalator,
fell and caught his hands in the moving parts of the machine and was unable to
remove them. Although there were clerks and agents of the defendant within a
few feet of the boy, and although there was a switch on each floor that would stop
the machine instantly, it was not turned off for from three to five minutes; thooinjury was, of course, greatly aggravated by the continued running of the machine.
The plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the defendant, first, in that the
machine was improperly constructed, maintained and operated, and, second, in not
going to his assistance immediately. In answer to interrogatories, the jury found
that the defendant was not negligent in the selection, construction, or operation
of the machine. On the basis of these findings, the defendant moved for a directed
verdict in its favor, contending that it had no legal duty to go to the aid or rescue
of the plaintiff who was responsible for his own peril. The court overruled defendants motion and entered judgment for the plaintiff. Recovery was limited to damages suffered through the aggravation of the injury resulting from the delay in
stopping the machine. This decision was affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court.
In its affirming opinion the court said, "There may be a legal duty to take positive
or affirmative steps to effect the rescue of a person who is helpless and in a situation
of peril when the one proceeded against is a master or invitor, or when the injury
resulted from the use of an instrumentality under the control of the defendant.
Such an obligation may exist although the accident or original injury was caused
by the negligence of the plaintiff or a third party and without any fault on the part
of the defendant. Other relationships may impose a like obligation, but it is not
necessary to pursue that inquiry further at this time." 2 The court continued, "The
relationship here of invitee was sufficient relationship to impose a duty upon the
21.

10 N. J. M. 281, 158 At. 851 (1932).

1. 40 N. E. (2d) 334 (1942).
2. Italics mine.
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appellant. Appellants duty arose after the injury. He can be charged only with
the failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid aggravation. The measure of that
duty is not unlike that imposed by the last clear chance doctrine of discovered
peril."
The defendant in support of its position relied on the general rule that there
is no legal duty-only a moral obligation-to go to the aid or rescue of a person
who has through his own negligent conduct placed himself in a dangerous position
from which he cannot recover without help, unless there is a relationship between
the parties that placed such a duty on the defendant. Defendant contends that
the relationship of invitor and invitee does not create such a duty. Previous cases
both in England and America seem to be unanimous in support of the defendant's
position. The rescue cases all point out that although the Levite and the Priest
had a strong moral obligation to go to the aid of the injured man by the wayside,
they could not be punished for their failure to do so. Their only punishment could
be from the voice of their own conscience and the stigma which society places
upon inhumane acts.
This general rule as to the duty to rescue is not to be confused with the situation where the defendant through his own negligence caused the initial injury and
then upon becoming aware of it does nothing to prevent further aggravation of
the injury. In that case the defendant in addition to being liable for the initial
injury is also liable for the aggravation on the grounds of causation. Neither is
the general rule to be confused with the cases where the defendant voluntarily
undertakes to go to the rescue of an injured person and then negligently leaves him
in a worse position. This point is probably best illustrated by the case of Northern
Central R. R. v. Maryland, Use of Price.3 In that case the defendant's train crew
removed the supposedly dead man from the tender of the engine after lie had been
struck through no negligence on the part of the railroad company. He was then
thoughtlessly placed in a locked warehouse for the night without examination by a
doctor. During the night he regained consciousness but was unable to get out of the
warehouse and died. The court in that case held the railroad company liable. The
case is often cited for the proposition that there is a duty to rescue a person in
danger where an instrumentality within the control of the defendant caused the
danger or injury even though the accident occurred through no fault of the defendant. However, it is submitted that the case does not stand for that proposition, but rather for the principle that once the defendant undertakes to give aid,
he is under a legal duty to leave the injured person in no worse position.
Certain exceptions have been recognized to the rule that there is no duty to
go to the aid of an injured person or a person in danger of injury where the negligence of the defendant is not responsible for the danger or the injury. In these
exceptions the prior relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff places a duty on
the defendant to use reasonably humane care in aiding after injury or going to

3. 29 Md. 420 (1868).
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the rescue of the plaintiff. The relationships which give rise to this duty are:
1. Some master-servant relationships.
(a) Where the servant engaged in carrying on the master's business is placed
in an isolated spot, dependent upon the master for the necessities of life and unable to provide for himself, the master has a duty to give aid when he is injured,
or go to his rescue if he is in danger. The best example of this is the case of the
sailor at sea dependent upon the master for food, shelter, clothing and medical
attention. Should the sailor -fall over-board, for instance, in the performance of
his duties, the captain of the ship has a clear legal duty to go to the aid of the
sailor where that would not prejudice the safety of the ship or other members
of the crew or passengers. 4 If the sailor should receive an injury or become sick,
he has a right to the best medical attention available on the ship at the ship's
expense. 5 The maritime law is sensitive to the rights of seamen and sedulous for
their protection. In the case of Hyatt v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. 6 the plaintiff was hired to shovel snow off the defendant's tracks at an isolated spot during
the night. The plaintiff took the job in reliance on the defendant's promise to
provide the workers with a heated car to warm themselves during the night. The
defendant failed to provide the warm car and the court held the railroad liable
in tort for injuries sustained by the plaintiff from the cold.7 It will be seen that
the duty imposed on the master in this situation arises from the relationship of
master and servant-that is, the isolation of the servant, his dependence on
the master for the necessities of life, and the dangers inherent in the employment.
(b) Where the servant is not isolated or dependent upon the master, some
courts have held that when he is injured through no negligence on the part of the
master, the master nevertheless has a duty to use reasonable care and diligence in
alleviating the suffering occasioned by the accident. The Indiana court in the
principal case cites Raasch v. Elite Laundry Co.s in support of this proposition.
In that case, the plaintiff caught her hand in a mangle iron through no fault of the
defendant. The foreman, however, in attempting to extricate her negligently
started the motor and pulled her hand farther into the machine thus greatly
aggravating the injury. The defendant was held liable for the aggravation. It
is submitted, however, that this case, like the case of Northern Central R. R. v.
Maryland, Use of Price9 stands for the proposition that once a rescue is attempted,
the defendant owes a duty to leave the plaintiff in no worse position. Dicta in the

4. See United States v. Knowles, 26 Fed. Cases 801 (1864) and Harris v.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 50 F. (2d) 866 (1931).
5. See Scarff v. Metcalf, 107 N. Y. 211 (1887).
6. 19 Mo. App. 287 (1885).
7. See also Schumaker v. St Paul & Duluth R. R. Co., 46 Minn. 39 (1891)
and Clifford v. The Denver, South Park & Pacific R. R. Co., 9 Col. 333 (1886)
holding in accord with the Hyatt case. But cf. King v. Interstate Consolidated
R. R., 23 R. I. 583 (1902).
8. 98 Minn. 375 (1906).
9. Loc. cit.
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Raasch case, however, are very strong to the effect that the master has a duty to
aid. The court said, "Those who employ methods or instrumentalities which are
naturally dangerous and are liable to be the means of causing injuries to the ignorant and unfortunate should be required to take reasonable means to alleviate
the suffering occasioned by the accident, although up to that time, the master
is under no legal duty to respond in damages."' 0 The court recognizes, however,
authority contra."" Section 512 of the Restatement of the Law of Agency recognizes a duty on the part of the master to take the first steps in giving relief and
to continue in the care of the servant until he is able to care for himself or until
he can be cared for by others in those situations where the master is engaged in
a dangerous occupation where severe harm may be expected, or where the business
is conducted in an isolated place in which the employees reasonably believe that
they will be taken care of if they are hurt or become ill while acting within the
scope of employment. No opinion, however, is expressed as to whether a duty is
owed by a master who is engaged in a non-hazardous activity in a place which is
not isolated.
The court in the principal case relies rather heavily on the case of Tippecanoe
Loan & Trust Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R. 1 2 In that case the plaintiff
was employed by the defendant as a section hand. He was injured in a collision
and members of the crew took charge of him. He was taken to a doctor and then
to a hospital. During the trip he was placed in a cold car and was not covered.
Blood poisoning set in as a result and he died. His administrator sued, basing his
claim on the negligence of the crew members in taking care of the injured decedent.
The jury found that the exposure to the cold was responsible for the death of the
decedent. The court granted a new trial, saying that if an employee injured as a
result of hazards in his job subjects himself to injury, the company has a duty to
use due care in taking necessary and proper steps to avoid aggravation of the injury.
If they take him into their care, they must exercise reasonable care in the treatment given him. It is submitted that here again the case relied on by the Indiana
court is not exactly in point, since it did not hold directly that the defendant was
negligent in not going to the aid of the injured man. The real holding of the case
on the exact facts is that the defendants after going to the aid of the injured man
were negligent in taking care of him, and are therefore liable; whereas in the principal case the defendants are held liable for their failure to go to the rescue of the
injured plaintiff.
10. See Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172 S. W. 43 (1914).
This is a strong decision holding the master liable for failure to secure prompt
medical assistance for an injured employee who was employed to perform dangerous
work and was injured while performing that work so badly as to be incapacitated
from caring for himself. The Missouri court cites and discusses many of the cases
relied on by the Indiana court in the principal case. See (1915) 8 U. OF Mo. BULL.
L. SER. 41 for a discussion of the Hunicke decision.
11. Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900); Stager v. Troy Laundry Co., 38 Ore. 480, 63 Pac. 645 (1901).
12. 104 N. E. 866 (1914).
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2. Carrier-passengerrelationskip.
The cases are in conflict as to whether the railroad has a duty to aid a passenger who becomes sick en route or who places himself in a position of danger
on the train through no fault of the railroad. The rule in Missouri seems to be that
the carrier owes a duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances at least
to infirm passengers where notice is had of the infirmity.' 3 The majority of the
14
cases, however, seem to hold that there is no duty.
3.' Injury caused by defendant but without negligence.
It has been suggested that where the defendant through some act or the use
of a dangerous instrumentality causes injury to the plaintiff, there is a duty to
use reasonable care in aiding the injured person, even though the defendant is not
liable for the initial injury or danger. Section 314 of the Restatement of Torts
lays down the following principle as governing the duty to aid or rescue others
where there is no liability up to that point: "Duty to Act for Protection of Others.
The actor's realization that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or
protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." Comment c qualifies the above by saying, "The rule stated in this Section applies only
where the peril, in which the actor knows the other is placed, is not due to any
active force which is under the actor's control. If a force is within the actor's
control, his failure to control it is treated as though he were actively directing it
and not as a breach of duty to take affirmative steps to prevent its continuance."
However, the Restatement cites no authority in support of this qualification to
the general rule as stated.' 5 Many cases which seem at first glance to support this
proposition upon further analysis reveal that the defendant had undertaken the
care of the injured person and then negligently left him in a worse position. The
line of demarcation between these two principles is often rather shadowy, and many

13. Layne v. Chicago and Alton R. R., 175 Mo. App. 34, 157 S. W. 850 (1913).
(By dictum the duty was said to extend to the sick and other physically and
mentally disabled passengers.)
14. See Brown's Adm'r. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 44 S. W. 648 (1898);
Prospert v. Rhode Island Suburban Ry. Co., 67 At. 522 (R. I. 1907); Fagg's Adm'r.
v. L. & N. R. R., 63 S. W. 580 (1901); New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern
R. R. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 607 (1869), Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. Marr's
Adm'x., 85 S. W. 188 (1905); Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe R. R. v. Weber, Adm'r.,
33 Kan. 543 (1885); Wheeler v. Grand Trunk Ry., 70 N. H. 607 (1900); Union
Pacific Ry. v. Beatty, 35 Kan. 265 (1886).
15. The Restatement § 314 gives the following hypothetical cases illustrating
the qualification in Comment c: "2. A, a factory owner, sees B, a young child or
blind man who has wandered into his factory about to approach a piece of moving
machinery. A is guilty of negligence if he permits the machinery to continue in
motion when by the exercise of reasonable care he could stop it before B comes
in contact with it. 3. A, a trespasser in the freight yards of the B Railroad Co.
falls beneath a slowly moving train. The conductor of the train sees A and by
signalling the engineer could readily stop the train in time to prevent its running
over A, but does not do so. While a bystander might not be liable to A for
deliberately refusing to help him from under the train, the B Railroad is liable
for permitting the train to continue in motion with knowledge of A's peril."
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courts do not clearly distinguish. The cases generally do not fall in line with this
suggestion. Without some prior relationship creating a duty, it would seem that
the mere act of causing the injury or danger without fault on the defendant's part
does not give rise to the duty to rescue or aid.'8 It is submitted, however, that
there is a growing tendency to place some responsibility on those who injure others
although without fault. This tendency is evidenced in one instance by the "hitand-run" statutes enacted by most states making it a crime for the driver of an
automobile to leave the scene of an accident without first giving aid or at least
revealing his identity.' 7
4. Invitor-invitee relationship.
In general, the relatonship of invitor and invitee does not impose a duty on the
invitor to go to the rescue of the invitee who through no fault of the invitor places
himself in a dangerous position. The case of Depue v. Flateau'8 is cited in the
principal case as authority to the contrary. In that case the plaintiff, a buyer, spent
the day at the defendant's farm buying furs. He was invited to dinner and after
dinner complained of feeling sick and weak. He was refused permission to spend
the night and was assisted by the defendant and the defendant's son to his carriage.
The plaintiff was in a very weak and practically helpless condition. The reins were
thrown over his shoulders and his horse started on the road toward the plaintiff's
home. It was a cold night. The next morning the plaintiff was discovered lying
16. See Weymire v. Wolfe, 52 Iowa 533 (1879). Deceased got drunk at the
defendant's saloon. At closing time he was unconscious and helpless, but was put
out in the cold and died of exposure. The trial court instructed the jury that if
deceased had by voluntarily purchasing and drinking the liquor contributed to his
own death, the verdict should be for the defendant. The Supreme Court of Iowa
reversed the trial court saying, "If defendant negligently subjected Dunn (deceased)
to exposure to his injury, knowing he was unconscious, even helpless, the defendant
cannot escape liability on account of Dunn's negligence prior to the wrongful acts
whereby Dunn was subjected to exposure, however great Dunn's negligence may
have been."
17. IND. REv. STAT. (1934) § 11171 provides: "Any person who while driving
or operating a motor vehicle or motor bicycle on any highway in this state, although
he may not be at fault, shall strike, wound or injure any human being, or shall
meet with an accident whereby any other person receives an injury or the property
of other persons is damaged, shall immediately stop, render or offer to render
assistance, and give to the injured person or to some person who is with such
person or to the owner or person in charge and control of the damaged property,
his name,...

address, .

.

. and license number.

. . ."

Violation of this statute is

a felony. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 8401 (f) provides: "Leaving scene of accident:
No person operating or driving a vehicle on the highway knowing that an injury
has been caused to a person or damage has been caused to property, due to culpability of said operator or driver, or to accident, shall leave the place of said
injury, damage or accident without stopping and giving name, residence, including
*.

motor vehicle number

. . .

to the injured person or . . . the nearest police

officer." See State v. Hudson, 285 S. W. 733, 314 Mo. 599 (1926), "Whether
injury to property was accidental or culpable act is immaterial to offense of
feloniously leaving scene of accident"
18. 111 N. W. 1 (Minn. 1907).
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nearly frozen by the roadside some distance from the defendant's house. The
Minnesota court held the defendant liable, saying, "Whenever one person is by
circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of
ordinary sense, who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use
ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances, he
would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises
to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such injury or danger. The obligation is
imposed as a matter of law and not sentiment." It is conceded that the language
of the court is clearly to the effect that there is a duty to aid an injured person
although the defendant is not responsible for the injury or sickness. However, under
the exact facts of the case, the defendant and his son had undertaken to aid the
plaintiff by assisting him into his carriage, and in so doing had left him in a much
worse position. It may be possible, therefore, to distinguish this case from the
principal case on the facts, although the language used by the Minnesota court
indicates the same viewpoint in regard to the duty to aid.
Professor Ames some time ago urged that legal duty be substituted for moral
duty in this type of case. 19 He presented this question for discussion: Should a
person be liable for wilful inaction where there is no relation creating a recognized
legal duty-where the only relation is that of one human to another?" For instance, should a man go unpunished at law for standing idly by watching another
drown when he could easily have thrown him a life preserver and thus saved his
life? Or, suppose that a careful hunter fires at a flying bird and the shot glances
from a tree limb and strikes the heretofore unseen plaintiff in the eye knocking
him stunned into a shallow pool of water. Should the hunter, although without
fault or liability up to that point be allowed to stand by and watch the plaintiff
drown when he could easily pull him out? Mr. Ames thought not. It will be
seen that the moral culpability if not the legal liability of the hunter is greater
than that of the innocent bystander, because it was the act of the hunter (even
though it was not negligent) which placed the plaintiff in his perilous position.
Mr. Ames admitted that it would be difficult to draft legislation which would fairly
draw the line between the cases where it is reasonable to require a person to rescue
and cases where it would be unreasonable. But he pointed out that "drawing the
line" is difficult if not impossible in many legal situations, and yet it is done. Mr.
Ames suggested this as a working rule: "One who fails to interfere to save another
from impending death or great bodily harm when he might do so with little or no
inconvenience to himself and the death or great bodily harm follows as a consequence of his inaction, shall be punished criminally and shall make compensation
to the party injured or his widow and children in case of death." There is little
doubt but that Professor Ames would approve of the result and the principle
announced in the principal case.

19. Ames, Law and Morals (1908) 22 H. v.L. REv. 97.
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Professor Bohlen in his article, "MoralDuty to Aid Others,"20 made a thorough
analysis of the subject. He said, "On the whole it may be said that duties to take
positive action for the benefit and protection of others attach only to certain
relationships; and are imposed only when absolutely necessary for the protection
of 'others and only to the extent generally necessary to afford them protection."
He states further that, "Cases which seem to go farthest in imposing a duty on
the defendant based upon moral or ethical standards-in all but one case there
will be some other ground for plaintiff's recovery: (1) Defendant has not merely
failed to assist but by some act done with knowledge or means of knowledge of his
peril has turned it into actual injury or has increased the injury already sustained.
(2) Defendant stood in some antecedent relationship which imposed duty. (3) Defendant by voluntarily taking charge of the situation after knowing of the peril has,
as it were, assumed a position of voluntarily though gratuitous bailee of his safety."
In conclusion, it would seem that the Indiana court has taken a new step in
imposing legal liability for failure to go to the rescue of a person in danger; or, in
other words, the Indiana court has added another exception to the general rule.
In Indiana, at least, it would seem that the relationship of invitor and invitee imposes a duty to use reasonable care and diligence in aiding those who through their
own negligence place themselves in a dangerous position.
It is submitted that this case is in line with the more modern view or
philosophy as indicated by various legislative enactments. It does not seem to
the writer that this duty imposes too great a burden upon defendants-at least it
does not seem too great a burden where there is some prior relationship between
the parties. Is it too much to require that people act humanely to save life or
prevent injury to a fellow human where that can be done reasonably and without
great danger or inconvenience to the rescuer?
MAX POWELL

20. (1908) 56 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 217, 317.
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